Postwar Historical Interpretations of the Origin and
Significance of Modern American Liberalism
Jim Safley

It is difficult, if not impossible, to speak of historical origins without revealing a certain partiality associated with the thing being discussed. Indeed, it is commonly assumed that the origin of a thing inherently conveys the purpose of its existence. Whether a thing is justified to exist, or in what capacity it should exist, is frequently associated with its beginnings. For these reasons, it is fitting to explore the origins of what one historian calls "one of the most frequently studied subjects in the historiography of the United States ." [1]

American liberalism, far from being a universally accepted meta-narrative or model, provokes much debate among historians and political theoreticians. Its connotations vary widely according to the presuppositions and ideologies of those who write its history or investigate its epistemological origins. Regardless of one's feelings toward liberalism, these origins are important considerations in understanding its significance to the modern American experience.

This essay will explore the changing definitions of liberalism from the end of the World War II to the modern period. This will be accomplished by following historigraphical trends of mid to late 20th century American historians and identify their distinct interpretations on the origins and significance of modern American liberalism. There are many interpretations of American liberalism prior to the 1950s, but none appreciably correspond to the particularities of the modern period. Therefore this essay will begin at postwar consensus historical scholarship, move on New Left scholarship, and end with the varied historiography of the modern period.

Arguably the most influential and most often cited scholar of American liberalism is Richard Hofstadter. His Pulitzer Prize winning book The Age of Reform (1955) broke ground in what is called the "consensus school" of American historiography. The consensus school, widely recognized today as the major historiographical movement of the late 1940s and the 1950s, came out of the apparent political accord of postwar America . Its essential premise is that all Americans share the same basic values, and whatever differences that do exist are exaggerated in contrast to their similarities.

According to Hofstadter the common thread that holds American values together is an entrenched "liberal tradition," characterized, interestingly enough, by a "sustained tradition of opposition and protest and reform." Without this sustained struggle for change, he claims, the "American system would have been… nothing but a jungle, and would probably have failed to develop into the remarkable system for production and distribution that it is." [2] This belief captures the essence of consensus scholarship: liberalism is the only significant tradition in American politics.

Much of Hofstadter's prose in The Age of Reform is clouded in ambivalence on the genuine character of the American liberal tradition. [3] Even though he acknowledges their inevitability, he is critical of the major periods of liberal influence, including the populist revolt, the Progressive Era, and the New Deal. But this is clearly a reaction against the previously held belief that these periods were radical or revolutionary in nature. [4] Indeed, Hofstadter's brand of liberalism was premised on the inherent stability of the American experience; radicalism, on the other hand, implies instability. In this view, liberal trends like the progressivism and New Deal liberalism were inevitable developments of American politics, not liberal revolutions.

Another noted member of the consensus school of history, and a contemporary of Hofstadter, is Louis Hartz, author of the seminal work in the study of American liberalism, The Liberal Tradition in America (1955). Like Hofstadter, Hartz believes the underpinnings of the American experience can best be explained by national unity rather than conflict. But unlike Hofstadter, Hartz defines liberalism exclusively in Lockean terms – that is, the ideal of popular but limited government through universal suffrage. [5] His emphasis on Lockean, or traditional, liberalism allows him to underscore the unity of American society without acknowledging periods of conflict that his predecessors identified. For instance, he staunchly claims that "there has never been a 'liberal movement' or a real 'liberal party' in America : we have only has the American Way of Life." [6]

Hartz's " American Way of Life" narrative portrays a sustained tradition devoid of genuine political extremes. He explains further that the Lockean tradition is "a kind of self-completing mechanism, which insures the universality of the liberal idea." [7] Therefore, Hartz, as well as Hofstadter, would agree that modern American liberalism is a misnomer; America was conceived as a liberal society and those same liberal institutions endured to contemporary times.

What separates Hartz from Hofstadter's mode of consensus history, however, is Hartz's unmistakable association with the neo-conservative movement of the time. The Liberal Tradition in America is decidedly less ambivalent than The Age of Reform about the non-revolutionary character of the progressive movement and the New Deal. What made these periods "radical," Hartz writes, was "the smothering by the American Lockian faith of the socialist challenge to it." [8] Hartz took an aggressive stance against Marxism and Communism, denouncing them as serious threats to the " American Way of Life." This is why he is so critical of Charles Beard and other earlier progressive historians who believed internal conflict molds American society. [9]

Hartz, like Hofstadter and most adherents to the consensus school, was an avowed anticommunist. The consensus school, some have argued, could be more a reaction to the destabilizing effects of Communism than a wholesale acknowledgment of congruent American values. Even so, their arguments of an indelible American consensus would prove to be insufficient to reconcile the political turbulence of the 1960s.

By the mid-1960s the consensus/neo-conservative movement all but collapsed in the wake of political and social turmoil. The civil rights movement and Vietnam War caused many to doubt the previously plausible concept of a sustained "liberal tradition." Consequently, anti-consensus scholarship, labeled New Left, spread through the disillusioned intellectual community. The New Left rejected the consensus arguments that judged modern liberalism as inevitable. Instead, in a show of true radicalism, they claimed that modern liberalism scarcely, or never, existed in the American experience.

One of the most recognized and radical New Left exponent is Howard Zinn. His book, A People's History of the United States (1980), reads as an unflattering exposé of American history. Zinn calls his book a "biased account," but he makes no apologies for it, "because the mountain of history books under which we all stand leans so heavily in one direction… that we need some counterforce to avoid being crushed into submission." [10] The "one direction" to which he refers is the generally positive and respectful viewpoint by historians about American statesmen and institutions.

In A People's History , Zinn distinguishes between popular liberalism and state sponsored liberalism: the former being truly progressive, and the latter being inherently oppressive. Regarding the progressive movement of the early twentieth-century, he admits that it was indeed "a 'Progressive Period,' the start of the Age of Reform; but it was reluctant reform, aimed at quieting the popular risings, not making fundamental changes." [11] He said the same for the legacy of the New Deal – that for all its adjustments to the national infrastructure, "the same system that had brought depression and crisis – the system of waste, of inequality, of concern for profit over human need – remained." [12]

The New Left movement continued into the 1980s, and, to a certain extent, continues to influence American historical scholarship today. Though few were as radical as Zinn, most historians accepted the New Left argument and backed away from the outdated consensus standpoint, all the while reevaluating their interpretations of American liberalism. But unlike the New Left, most historians agreed that a modern liberal tradition did indeed exist, but it was not, as the consensus school claimed, deeply embedded in American tradition since the nation's beginning. Rather, it is of more recent origins, derived from liberal periods such as the Gilded Age, the Progressive Era, the New Deal, or the Cold War. As a result, historical interpretations of American liberalism became increasingly diversified and fervently contested.

By the 1980s, during the conservative Reagan era, a few historians modified the old consensus argument to fit the post-consensus paradigm. Alonzo L. Hamby, for example, wrote quite extensively on liberalism, but unlike New Left scholars wrote as a devout centrist. His book, Liberalism and Its Challengers (1985), explores the relatively recent political origins of liberalism in the United States . Like consensus historians, Hamby downplays the idea that the New Deal was revolutionary, but nevertheless acknowledges its significant legacy to subsequent political generations. [13]

The New Deal established what Hamby calls "moderate liberalism." [14] "From Roosevelt on," he explains, "the momentum of American politics was in the direction of more liberalism." [15] That is, until the presidency of Ronald Reagan. At the end of the book Hamby quite unceremoniously concedes that the New Deal "liberal tradition" has "reached its limits" during the Reagan administration, and wonders if the president "would become the personification of a new national consensus, the Roosevelt of the Right." [16]

A year after Liberalism and Its Challengers was published, renowned historian Author M. Schlesinger, Jr. published his own analysis on the history of American liberalism, The Cycles of American History (1986). Schlesinger was one of the last holdovers of the progressive/conflict historiography that grew to prominence before the consensus era. [17] His unique interpretation of American political history emphasizes the cyclical dynamics between periods of liberal action and conservative consolidation. This cyclical theory is premised on Schlesinger's belief that American democracy is an ongoing experiment, and a rejection of the more conservative belief in American providence, or a God-given "sacred destiny." [18]

Schlesinger is unapologetically liberal-minded, and his emphasis on cyclical history and the national experiment bespeaks a pragmatic, if not progressively activist, mind. The origin of American liberalism, let alone modern American liberalism, is what he calls an "affirmative government" – that is, a proactive federal government working to ensure public wellbeing. [19] This system of government emerged in America , he claims, during the early nineteenth-century, when economic development necessitated government action. [20]

When speaking of America 's prevailing liberalism Schlesinger asserts that "the tradition of affirmative government is… quite as deeply ingrained in our national history… as the competing tradition of self-interest and scrambling private enterprise." [21] Here he outlines his progressive/conflict historigraphical perspective: America is defined by internal conflict, not by national unity. Periods of political stagnancy invariably stimulate periods of liberal crusading, which in turn stimulate the need for national consolidation, and so on.

More recent historians of the origins and significance of modern liberalism are less inspired by the consensus argument as was Hamby, and many, though respectful of it, shy away from Schlesinger's cyclical theory. Also, the New Left voice is faintly heard, most likely because modern liberalism isn't a compelling topic to those who disbelieve its existence. Though many historians recognize that modern liberalism exists, few agree on its origins and its significance to contemporary times. Some even disapprove how modern liberalism has taken shape, and call for a return to earlier forms of progressive thought.

In his book, The Lost Promise of Progressivism (1994), Eldon J. Eisenach derides modern liberalism as a "conflicted child" of two, as he sees it, deficient versions of progressivism: "Wilsonian progressivism" and "managerial progressivism." [22] It is his estimation that the progressive movement of the early twentieth-century brought "institutional, moral, and institutional coherence" to American society; [23] but these promising trends died with the presidential election of Woodrow Wilson and the rising influence of corporate America . "The passage from Progressivism to liberalism," he laments, "was a kind of euthanasia of articulate and contestable ideas, an implicit denial that America either needed or had them." [24]

The Lost Promise of Progressivism reads as a presentist call for a return to the progressive mode of thought, condemning the modern liberalism that was handed down by Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. [25] Such presentism is not uncommon in the works of America liberalism scholars. Schlesinger, for example, acknowledged the inescapability of viewing the past in present terms: "The historian, like everyone else is trapped in the egocentric predicament, and 'presentism' is his original sin." [26] Increasingly, historians of all varieties recognized this "sin," but still few were willing to embrace it unconditionally.

Another recent look into the origins of liberalism is Alan Brinkley's prominent book Liberalism and Its Discontents (1998). In the book, Brinkley puts the origin of modern liberalism at the New Deal and "postwar expansion of federal social and economic responsibilities." [27] But he contends that this liberal tradition all but collapsed after the 1960s when both liberals and conservatives, who were forced to adopt the tradition, became disaffected by poor results. Some elements of the old liberal tradition still exist, but at a greatly reduced capacity and stymied by conservative policies. [28]

Brinkley challenges the consensus belief that liberalism in the only major political tradition in America : "Nothing has become clearer over the past thirty years… that the consensus argument… was wrong." Instead he rejuvenates the older progressive/conflict argument, maintaining that "there have been powerful alternative traditions at work throughout the twentieth century – and indeed throughout the American history." [29] The political tradition in which he wrote Liberalism and Its Discontents was one conservative influence, which Brinkley, who is a liberal himself, obviously found discomforting. He ends the book with a call for scholars to reclaim the liberal tradition and appreciate the "central role of liberalism (in all its various forms) in our modern history." [30]

The new millennium brought with it new interpretations of the origin and significance of modern liberalism. In The Strange Death of American Liberalism (2001) historian H. W. Brands defines modern liberalism as "premised on a prevailing confidence in the ability of government… to accomplish substantial good on behalf of the American people." [31] But, as his title suggests, modern liberalism no longer exists in the same capacity it enjoyed during the Cold War. Indeed, Brands views the Cold War, not Roosevelt 's New Deal or other periods of liberal influence, "as the wellspring of postwar liberalism." [32] When the "Cold War consensus" broke down during Vietnam , Americans felt less inclined to tolerate governmental intrusion – in effect killing modern liberalism. [33]

Two other authors who lament the present decline of American liberalism are Nancy Cohen and William H. Chafe. In The Reconstruction of American Liberalism (2002), Cohen puts the origin of twentieth-century liberalism at the Gilded Age (which is an uncommon interpretation), but concedes that "the victory of Ronald Reagan… signaled the irreversible defeat of the now aged modern liberalism." [34] Comparatively, Chafe, editor of the compilation The Achievement of American Liberalism (2003), definitively puts the New Deal at "the beginning point for any discussion of liberalism," yet draws attention to the "crisis for the viability of liberalism," caused primarily by the conservative ideological values of Nixon and Reagan. [35]

The view that modern American liberalism no longer exists in coherent form, as suggested by Brands, Brinkley, Cohen, and Chafe, is widespread among the contemporary historical community. Many would argue that this is because liberal historians – those who tend to write the histories of liberal America – are unsatisfied with current political trends. By portraying liberal periods in the history of America favorably, many historians, whether explicitly or implicitly, seek a renewal of those traditions in modern society. Some are activist-minded, like Schlesinger and Brinkley, and more others attempt to be fairly objective; but all stress the significance of liberalism to the history of the United States .

Since the end of World War II there have been numerous historical interpretations of the origins and significance of modern American liberalism. The consensus school maintained the continuity of liberalism, emphasizing the basic stability of American institutions. The New Left doubted that there was a truly liberal tradition in America ; rather there were moderate uprisings that were quickly suppressed and incorporated by conservative interests. And recent historiographies acknowledge liberalism's existence, but question its significance to the modern period. Such divergence leads many contemporary intellectuals to accept the relativity and, more apprehensively, the uncertain future of liberalism.

Concerning the future of modern American liberalism – or "progressivism," as the liberal community is now adopting – respected liberal historian Otis Graham, Jr. observed that "whatever is ahead, at the start of the twenty-first century the liberal narrative is fragmented into confusion, the connections to the mainstream public lost, along with a convincing vision of what the historic moment requires. Liberals had lost their story." [36] To modern liberals, then, uncovering the origins of liberalism, though important for historical reference, is not as important as developing a new coherent liberal narrative. One wonders what historians of modern liberalism from each of the periods discussed above would say about the post-September 11 era, particularly how the attacks have affected, or will affect, the overall character of American liberalism.

Bibliography

Brands, H. W. The Strange Death of American Liberalism . New Haven : Yale University Press, 2001.

Brinkley, Alan. Liberalism and Its Discontents . Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1998.

Chafe, William H., ed. The Achievement of American Liberalism: The New Deal and Its Legacies . New York : Columbia University Press, 2003.

Cohen, Nancy . The Reconstruction of American Liberalism, 1865-1914 . Chapel Hill : The University of North Carolina Press, 2002.

Eisenach, Eldon J. The Lost Promise of Progressivism . Lawrence , Kansas : University Press of Kansas , 1994.

Hamby, Alonzo L. Liberalism and its Challengers: FDR to Reagan . New York : Oxford University Press, 1985.

Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in America : An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution . New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1955.

Hofstadter, Richard. The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R . New York : Vintage Books, 1955.

Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M. The Cycles of American History . Boston : Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986.

Zinn, Howard. A People's History of the United States . New York : Harper Colophon , 1980.

Notes:

[1] Nancy Cohen, The Reconstruction of American Liberalism ( Chapel Hill : The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 9.

[2] Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F. D. R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 18.

[3] Hofstadter's definition of "liberal" is rather unspecific – simply "popular, democratic, progressive." Ibid., 13.

[4] Consensus scholars spent a great deal of energy refuting the progressive/conflict historiography that preceded them. This vein of historical scholarship, which flourished during the Progressive Era, emphasized the conflictive nature of American history – that social institutions work in opposition to each other, not in harmony with one another.

[5] Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America : An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1955), 59-61.

[6] Ibid., 11.

[7] Ibid., 6. According to Hartz this "mechanism" succeeds because, unlike European models, America escaped the "heritage of feudalism" during its earlier period and the "challenge of socialism" in later periods.

[8] Ibid., 261.

[9] Ibid., 27-28.

[10] Howard Zinn, A People's History of the United States (New York: Harper Perennial, 1980), 570.

[11] Ibid., 341. This was the foundation of radical New Left thought: from its outset the American system worked to nullify popular uprisings by instituting oppressive policies masked as political reform.

[12] Ibid., 394.

[13] Alonzo L. Hamby, Liberalism and Its Challengers: FDR to Reagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 4. Hamby overlooks the progressive movement as a viable source of modern liberalism because "it did not establish a distinct new tradition in American politics."

[14] Ibid., 51.

[15] Ibid., 5. "The new liberal tradition of social reform at home and energetic involvement overseas was consolidated by Harry S. Truman, elevated to the status of national consensus by Dwight D. Eisenhower, expanded to a near breaking point by Lyndon Johnson, and largely accepted by Richard Nixon as a part of the synthesis of liberalism and conservatism that characterized his presidency." Ibid., 3-4.

[16] Ibid., 354.

[17] Throughout his life, even to this day, Schlesinger revives certain elements of the progressive/conflict argument, particularly the more anti-radical progressivism, or "the vital center," as he calls it.

[18] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), 21.

[19] Ibid., 219-255.

[20] Ibid., 223.

[21] Ibid., 255. Though consensus historians make a similar argument that liberalism originates from America 's beginnings, Schlesinger's cyclical model highlights the oscillation between periods of liberalism and periods of liberalism.

[22] Eldon J. Eisenach, The Lost Promise of Progressivism (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 262.

[23] Ibid., 2. Eisenach 's hopes that his analysis of the progressive movement "will help to clarify the 'liberal-conservative' ideas that dominate our public discourse today and explain why both appear to thoughtful people as 'grievous error.'"

[24] Ibid., 4.

[25] According to Eisenach , New Deal liberalism was just as "devoid of intellectual interest or coherence" as Wilsonian progressivism. Ibid., 4.

[26] Schlesinger, 373.

[27] Alan Brinkley, Liberalism and Its Discontents (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), ix.

[28] "By the end of the 1960s… this secure liberal universe was already beginning to crumble. It soon collapsed, and it has never recovered. Today liberalism stands in apparent disarray – the word itself has become a term of widespread opprobrium." Ibid., x.

[29] Ibid., xi.

[30] Ibid., 296.

[31] H. W. Brands, The Strange Death of American Liberalism ( New Haven : Yale University Press, 2001), viii.

[32] Ibid., 175.

[33] Brands comments that if his argument is correct – "that the Cold War was a necessary precondition for the success of postwar liberalism – then the end of the Cold War would suggest that there isn't much hope for imminent resurrection of liberalism." Ibid., xii.

[34] Cohen, 5-6.

[35] William H. Chafe, ed., The Achievement of American Liberalism: The New Deal and Its Legacies ( New York : Columbia University Press), xvii.

[36] Otis L. Graham, Jr. "Liberalism after the Sixties: A Reconnaissance" in Chafe, 317.